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YOU CAN MOVE IN BUT YOU CAN'T STAY:
TO PROTECT OCCUPANCY RIGHTS AFTER
HALPRIN, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT NEEDS
TO BE AMENDED TO PROHIBIT POSTACQUISITION DISCRIMINATION
SCOTT N. GILBERT*
I.

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT NEEDS RENOVATING

The Blochs are Jewish, and their religious beliefs require
them to display a religious symbol called a mezuzah on the outer
doorframe of their residence, 1 which they did for over thirty years
When the Blochs' condominium board
without conflict. 2
reinterpreted an existing rule to prohibit display of the mezuzah,
their longstanding practice now clashed with the association's new
interpretation of the rule.3 They were denied an accommodation
based on their faith, 4 and building staff repeatedly removed the
Blochs' displays. 5 Prohibiting the mezuzah meant the Blochs
could only remain in the building by living in violation of Jewish
6
law.
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School 2009. The author wishes to thank
Professors F. Willis Caruso and Robert G. Schwemm for their guidance with
this Comment and their tireless advocacy for fair housing. The author also
wished to thank Elizabeth Barton for her thoughtful editing. The author
dedicates this Comment to his wife, Donna Harakal, and his mother, Susan
Rosseland, for their support and encouragement, and to the attorneys who
defend human rights over property rights.
1. A "mezuzah" is a small case containing a parchment scroll inscribed
with religious passages. Bloch v. Frischoltz, No. 05 C 5379, at 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
7, 2006) (unpublished case on file with the JMLS Fair Housing Clinic and the
author).
2. The Shoreline Towers Condominium Association Board amended the
association rules on September 10, 2001, to prohibit boots, mats, and any
Between its
other objects from being placed outside unit entrances. Id.
passage in 2001 and May 2004, the rule was not interpreted to apply to the
16, Bloch v.
Bloch's mezuzah. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at 3,
Frischoltz, No. 05 C 5379, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2006) (unpublished Plaintiffs
Second Amended Complaint on file with the JMLS Clinic and the author).
3. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3, 16.
4. The Board denied the Blochs' request for an exception to the rule in
September 2004. Bloch, No. 05 C 5379, at 2.
5. Id.
6. Remaining in the building under the board's interpretation of the rule
means that the Blochs are denied the full use and enjoyment of their dwelling
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Armed with the knowledge that federal civil rights laws
7
prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of religion and race,
the Blochs reasonably believed that their rights had been violated.
The Blochs sought the assistance of The John Marshall Law
School Fair Housing Legal Clinic ("JMLS Clinic") and filed suit in
federal district court.8 To their surprise, the Blochs' federal claims
did not survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 9
The district court in Bloch v. Frischoltz1 ° relied on a recent
Seventh Circuit case, Halprin v. PrairieSingle Family Homes of
Dearborn Park Ass'n, 1 which held the FHA inapplicable to "postacquisition housing discrimination" or discrimination that occurs
after a person takes possession of property.1 2 Accepting that the
Halprins had suffered housing discrimination because of their
religion, the Halprin court nevertheless denied them a remedy
because the conduct occurred after the sale.1 3 This interpretation
and application of the FHA in Halprin is currently the law in the
Seventh and Fifth circuits,14 and the Blochs are among the first to
be directly harmed by its erroneous holding. Currently pursuing
an appeal in the Seventh Circuit, the Blochs seek to have
summary judgment reversed, so they can go to trial. 15

because they are forced to live in violation of Jewish law. Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3, 10-11, and 5, 25.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
8. Originally filed in September 2005, the Bloch's moved to file their
second amended complaint on October 27, 2005. Plaintiffs Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 2, at 6, 40.
9. Bloch, No. 05 C 5379, at 2-4.
10. Id. at 2.
11. 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
12. Id. at 328-30. In granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment against the Blochs, Judge Guzman approvingly cited Halprin for the
proposition that the FHA "does not reach post-acquisition discrimination in
the enjoyment of property." Bloch, No. 05 C 5379, at 2.
13. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
14. The Fifth Circuit has adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
Halprin. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 742-43, 745 (5th Cir. 2005)
(holding that neither § 3604(a) nor § 3604(b) gave current owners a cause of
action for discriminatory delivery of services).
15. Oral argument before a panel of the Seventh Circuit took place on
February 20, 2008, and the Blochs' lead attorney at the Clinic argued for
reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial by distinguishing Bloch
from Halprin. Interview with James P. Whiteside, Clinical Attorney, The
John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic, in Chi., Ill. (Jan. 14,
2008). One point of distinction between the two cases is that Bloch involves an
association rule, while Halprin involved the conduct of individual board
members. Id. Discrimination by associations against housing occupants
should be prohibited under the FHA because associations exercise ongoing
control over occupancy rights. Id. The three judge panel issued its opinion on
July 10, 2008, ruling against the Blochs two to one. Bloch v. Frischholz, 533
F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2008). Judge Wood dissented, arguing that the conduct
in question violated the FHA, and that there were disputed issues of material
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The Fair Housing Act ("FHA") celebrated its fortieth
anniversary in 2008.16 With the last significant amendment in
1988,17 it is time to amend the Act again. While overt housing
discrimination may have decreased since 1968,18 fair and
nondiscriminatory housing for all is still a distant goal, rather
than a proud achievement. 19 Another goal of the FHA was
fact making summary judgment inappropriate. Id. at 566. In an unusual
move, however, the Seventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc on October
30, 2008. Id. at 562. The en banc hearing took place on May 13, 2009, but as
of September 7, 2009, no opinion has been released, so the Blochs' hope of
getting their day in court remains alive.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006). The FHA is more formally
referred to as "Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968," in recognition of its
place within the larger Civil Rights Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat.
73 (1968).
17. The FHA was amended in 1988 to add "handicap" as another protected
class and to enhance HUD's enforcement powers. Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). See infra text
accompanying notes 85-88 (discussing the amendments made to the FHA in
1988). "Protected classes" are the groups expressly listed in the FHA against
which discriminatory practices are illegal. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION 11-1 (ThomsonlWest 2007). The full
list of current protected classes includes: race, color, national origin, religion,
sex, handicap, and familial status. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
18. Since the FHA was passed in 1968, HUD has carried out three major
studies of housing discrimination in the United States: in 1979, 1991, and
2000. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 2-10 to -11. The 1979 study of forty
metropolitan areas determined that a black who went to four real estate
agents would face discrimination seventy-two percent of the time when
renting and forty-eight percent of the time when buying. Id. at 2-11 (citing
RONALD E. WIENK ET AL., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN
HOUSING MARKETS: THE HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY ES-2 (U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development 1979)). From the results of
this study, HUD estimated that "2,000,000 instances of housing
discrimination were occurring annually in the 1980's." Id. HUD's second
national study was published in 1991 and showed no significant change from
the earlier study. MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
STUDY: SYNTHESIS, at vii (HUD 1991). The 1991 study ran 3,800 paired tests
in twenty-five markets to record housing discrimination faced by black and
Hispanic testers. Id. at vi-vii. A "paired test" is where one white and one
black or Hispanic tester go to the same housing with identical credentials
except race. Id. Estimating from the test results, HUD found the rates of
discrimination for buyers to be-fifty-nine percent for blacks and fifty-six
percent for Hispanics; and for renters to be: fifty-three percent for black and
forty-six percent for Hispanics. Id. HUD's third national study was conducted
in 2000 and the conclusion is quite disappointing after thirty plus years of
federal fair housing law: despite declines since 1989, discrimination still
persists nationally in the sale and rental markets of large metropolitan areas.
MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING
MARKETS:
NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I OF THE HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION
STUDY
2000,
at
iii
(HUD
2002),

http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/phasel.html.
19. The 2000 HUD study estimated that in paired rental tests whites were
consistently favored over blacks 21.6 percent of the time, and that non-
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integration 20 -here, progress has been almost glacial. 21 The fortyone-year-old warning of the 1968 Kerner Commission 22 about two
different Americas. one for whites and one for blacks, is as
23
relevant today as it was then.
Among a litany of issues that could be addressed by amending
the FHA, this Comment is concerned with the fact that the FHA
does
not
expressly
prohibit
"post-acquisition
housing
discrimination." 24 Despite the lack of explicit language, fair
housing
commentators
understandably
thought 25
that

Hispanic whites were consistently favored 25.7 percent of the time. TURNER,
supra note 18, at iii-iv. As for home sales, whites were consistently favored
over blacks in seventeen percent of tests, while non-Hispanic whites were
consistently favored in 19.7 percent of tests. Id.
20. Senator Mondale, the principal sponsor of the FHA, was opposed to the
fact that the country was separating into "white ghettos" and "black ghettos."
114 CONG. REC. 2, 2276 (1968). The purpose of federal fair housing legislation
would be to replace this pattern with "truly integrated and balanced living
patterns." Id. at 3422.
21. Using the 2000 Census data, the extent of racially segregated housing
in the United States has been calculated at sixty-four for blacks and whites,
where a score of 100 equals total isolation of the races and 0 means total
integration. JOHN ICELAND & DANIEL H. WEINBERG, RACIAL AND ETHNIC
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000 60 (U.S.
Census
Bureau
2002),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
housingpatterns/pdf/censr-3.pdf. The 2000 score was down four points from
the 1990 score of sixty-eight, which in turn was down five points from the 1980
Census score of seventy-three. Id.
Although the score change reflects a
decrease in segregation over the twenty-year period, one commentator states
that there continues to be high levels of racial segregation and unlawful
discrimination, and that "[o]nly modest changes in these deep-seated patterns
have occurred since enactment of the 1968 Fair Housing Act." SCHWEMM,
supra note 17, at 2-1.
22. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) (hereinafter
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT).
23. In the wake of racial riots in urban American cities in the summer of
1967, President Johnson formed a commission to answer three questions:
what happened, why it happened, and how can it be prevented from
happening again. Id. The report's basic conclusion was that "[o]ur nation is
moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal."
Id.
24. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330. Commentators and other jurisdictions have
adopted and expounded on this phrase: "harassment that is alleged to have
occurred after a sale or rental transaction has been completed is referred to as
'post-acquisition harassment,' tracking language employed by the Seventh
Circuit." Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair
Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 232 n.23 (2006). On remand, the district
court adopted Judge Posner's phrase. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes
of Dearborn Park Ass'n, No. 01 C 4673, 2006 WL 2506223, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun.
28, 2006).
25. "Until recently, it was generally assumed that § 3604(b) not only
protects homeseekers in their efforts to secure housing on a nondiscriminatory
basis but also guarantees their right to equal treatment once they have
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discrimination occurring after a person took possession of their
dwelling 26 was covered by the FHA, as nearly forty years of broad
construction given to the FHA in Federal courts, 27 and past cases
successfully litigated 28 amply supported that view.
In Halprin, Judge Posner broke with past holdings and
decided that the FHA does not prohibit post-acquisition housing
discrimination, 29 at least where it did not rise to the level of actual
or constructive eviction. 30 Halprin will foreclose the use of a
federal court to remedy conduct that certainly appears to be an
FHA violation, as the Blochs can attest. As a result of Halprin,

become residents of that housing." SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 14-9.
"Congress must have intended the FHA to address housing disputes beyond
simple denials of accommodation." Short, supra note 24, at 220-21.
26. Under the FHA:
"Dwelling" means any building, structure, or portion thereof which is
occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one
or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease
for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure,
or portion thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006).
27. The Supreme Court set the tone in 1972 when it stated that "[t]he
language of the Act is broad and inclusive." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Trafficante held that white and black
apartment tenants had standing to sue under the FHA because the landlord's
discrimination, although aimed at third-party minorities seeking to rent, had
harmed the tenants by depriving them of the benefits of interracial
associations. Id. at 210. "We can give vitality to [§ 3604(a)] only by a
generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing
unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those
facilities within the coverage of the statute." Id. at 212.
28. Other courts that have upheld FHA claims based on post-acquisition
discrimination include: Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212; see also Krueger v.
Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that landlord's pattern of
sexual harassment before and after occupancy stated a claim under § 3604(b)
and
§ 3617, without expressly dealing with the post-acquisition issue);
DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) (accepting a "hostile
housing environment" cause of action, where the harassment must be
"pervasive" enough to "create an abusive [housing] environment," implicitly
endorsing the post-acquisition reach of the FHA because the harassment
occurred after the tenant took possession); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090
(10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the hostile housing environment claim where the
harassment "alters the conditions of the housing arrangement," implying postpossession interference with occupancy); Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351
F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding an analogous disability harassment
cause of action under the FHA, implicitly sanctioning post-acquisition claims
because the alleged harassment occurred during the tenant's occupancy).
29. Halprin,388 F.3d at 330.
30. Black's Law Dictionary defines "constructive eviction" as: "1. A
landlord's act of making premises unfit for occupancy, often with the result
that the tenant is compelled to leave. 2. The inability of a land purchaser to
obtain possession because of paramount outstanding title." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 594 (8th ed. 2004).
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aggrieved persons 31 seeking shelter under the FHA will be denied
a remedy for discrimination that used to be, and still should be,
actionable. 32 While national data on the prevalence of postacquisition discrimination is unavailable, this author reviewed
both the open cases and the new intakes at the JMLS Clinic in
33
2007 and found the problem to be quite common.
This Comment utilizes Halprin to argue that the FHA needs
to be amended to explicitly prohibit post-acquisition housing
Part II briefly covers the history of housing
discrimination.
discrimination in the United States, followed by a review of the
legislative history of the FHA. Part III analyzes the ambiguous
language of the FHA with regard to post-acquisition
discrimination and then examines the Halprin decision. Part IV
concludes that the FHA as written should cover post-acquisition
discrimination but then proposes that in order to adequately
protect the interest in nondiscriminatory occupancy, the FHA
should be amended to make the prohibition express.
II.

BY LOOKING BACK A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE WILL EMERGE

A. A Brief History of Housing Discriminationin the United States
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to comprehensively
trace the evolution of housing discrimination in the United States
or adequately explain the causes of contemporary housing
segregation. 34 An abbreviated overview is necessary, however, to
31. The FHA defines "aggrieved person" as "any person who (1) claims to
have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that
such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about
to occur." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2006).
32. See Cox, 430 F.3d at 742-43, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that neither
§ 3604(a) nor § 3604(b) gave current owners a cause of action for
discriminatory delivery of services); Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments Ltd.
P'ship, No. 05 C 0348, 2006 WL 1519320, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2006)
(following Halprin by rejecting post-acquisition claim under § 3604(a)); Reule
v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-05-3197 2005
WL 2669480, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (dismissing a § 3617 claim after
claiming to adopt the Seventh Circuit view that 24 C.F.R. 100.400(c)(2) is
invalid). But see East-Miller v. Lake County Highway Dept., 421 F.3d 558,
562 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding HUD regulation 100.400(c)(2) because its
validity was not challenged); Farrar v. Eldibany, 137 F. App'x 910, 912 (7th
Cir. 2005) (assuming that even if the HUD regulation 100.400(c)(2) phrase
"enjoyment of a dwelling" could sever § 3617 from the rest of the FHA, there
was no violation in the case at bar); George v. Colony Lake Property Owners
Assoc., No. 05 C 5899, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45229, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 19,
2006) (distinguishing Halprin on the ground that plaintiffs were
discriminatorily evicted, thus rendering their housing unavailable under
§ 3604).
33. See infra Part III(A) (reporting the results of the quantitative study this
author conducted at the JMLS Clinic).
34. See ICELAND & WEINBERG, supra note 21, at 60 (quantifying the extent
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put the FHA in historical context.
1. Before 1968
There is some historical evidence that blacks and whites lived
in mixed neighborhoods between the Civil War and the start of the
twentieth century. 35 As many blacks moved north in the early
1900s, 36 there was a concurrent black migration from rural to
urban areas. 37 The response was nearly a half century of official
and institutionalized
racial
discrimination, 38
leading to
hypersegregated housing patterns by 1940. 39
Government actions at times aided and abetted housing
discrimination, including the fact that zoning laws mandating
racial segregation were legal until 1917.40 In 1926, the Supreme
Court held that racially restrictive covenants in property deeds
were constitutional, 41 a ruling that was not reversed until 1948.42
During the 1930s, the Federal Housing Authority also officially
practiced housing discrimination by insuring mortgages only to
whites, for example. 43 The tide began to turn when President

of racial housing segregation in the U.S. based on data from the 2000 Census).
35. Average dissimilarity indices for large northern cities were forty-six in
1860, fifty-nine in 1910, and eighty-nine in 1940, highlighting the explosion in
segregated housing that accompanied the Twentieth Century. DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 21 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1993).
36. Only 70,000 blacks left the South during the 1870s, for example, while
industrialization and labor shortages drove that number to 197,000 between
1900 and 1910. Id. at 27-28. World War I and the need for even more labor
turned the "stream into a flood," such that 525,000 blacks migrated north
between 1910 and 1920, and the number grew to 877,000 for the 1920s. Id. at
29.
37. In 1870, eighty percent of blacks lived in the rural south; while by 1970,
eighty percent lived in urban areas. Id. at 18.
38. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (summarizing the history
of government complicity in promoting housing segregation before 1950).
39. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 35, at 21 (documenting the explosive
rise in segregated housing between 1860 and 1940).
40. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70, 82 (1917) (invalidating a
municipal ordinance that mandated segregated residential blocks as a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning
that such laws were constitutional prior to 1917).
41. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926) (holding that
racially restrictive covenants in real estate transactions did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment because there was no state action).
42. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (deciding that judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constituted the 'state action'
necessary to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the covenants
violated the Equal Protection Clause). Sadly, Shelley did not outlaw racially
restrictive covenants outright, and their use did not end until the FHA was
passed in 1968. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 3-10 to -11.
43. The Federal Housing Authority guaranteed mortgages in response to
the Great Depression, but the policies authorized racial discrimination by
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Kennedy issued an Executive Order in 1962, ordering the federal
government to stop discriminating in housing, although at that
44
time its reach was limited.
Private action also contributed to segregated living patterns,
45
as many Northern whites resented the influx of blacks.
47
46
loss of jobs, they reacted with violence and by
Primarily fearing
"white flight. '48 As a result, the black "ghetto" was born. 49 The
real estate agent profession is complicit in this history of
discrimination as well, as they formally utilized a list that ranked
races and nationalities based on their "beneficial effect on land
50
values."
protecting neighborhoods from "the infiltration of inharmonious racial
groups."
Karl D. Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing
Discrimination, 6 YALE LAW & POL'Y REV. 339, 341 (1988). Federally
sanctioned discrimination occurred until 1962. See infra note 49 (describing
the creation of black "ghettoes" in American cities).
44. President Kennedy signed Executive Order 11063 on November 20,
1962, that banned all racial discrimination in federal housing, which included
federal property and private property bought with federal loans or covered by
federal mortgage insurance. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (Nov.
20, 1962). The Order did not reach conventionally financed housing, and it did
not provide for judicial enforcement. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 3-7.
45. In response to black migration, Northern white resentment increased in
the 1920s, as many whites responded negatively to the massive immigration of
Southern blacks. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 35, at 29.
46. Southern black migrants competed with Northern whites for jobs and
were often employed as strikebreakers, which only compounded the existing
racism and resentment Northern whites held towards the new arrivals. Id. at
28-29.
47. Race riots, where blacks were attacked specifically because of the color
of their skin, erupted in large northern cities in response to the northern
migration of blacks early in the twentieth century. Id. at 30. "In Chicago
alone, between 1917 and 1921, fifty-eight black homes were bombed,
averaging one every twenty-one days." Short, supra note 24, at 252-53.
48. Flight to the suburbs after World War II was more attractive to whites
than "defense of threatened neighborhoods" in racially changing areas.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 35, at 45.
49. The Kerner Commission defined a "ghetto" as a part of a city affected by
poverty and social disorganization, where racial minorities live "under
conditions of involuntary segregation." KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 22, at 12. The black ghetto was fundamentally different than ethnic
European ghettos of the early Twentieth Century, because unlike blacks,
which remained in segregated housing, those groups were quickly assimilated
into white residential housing patterns. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 35, at
10; see also id. at 17-59 (exploring the creation of the black ghetto in America).
50. Homer Hoyt's infamous 1933 list was derived from real estate brokers
on the West Side of Chicago. F. WILLIS CARUSO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAIR HOUSING AND FAIR LENDING LAWS 4 (5th ed. 2004). The rankings were:
(1) English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, and Scandinavian; (2) Northern Italians;
(3) Bohemians or Czechoslovakian; (4) Poles; (5) Lithuanians; (6) Greeks;
(7) Russian Jews of the lower class; (8) South Italians; (9) Negroes [sic];
(10) Mexicans. Id. The National Association of Real Estate Brokers adopted a
discriminatory code of ethics in 1924, ordering agents not to bring races or
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1968 and Beyond

The year 1968 was a pivotal fair housing year for two reasons:
the Supreme Court decided a seminal housing rights case 51 and
Congress enacted the FHA.52
Relying on the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Court in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. held that
§§ 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 186653 reached private
conduct. 54 As a result, a private individual can be liable for
violating another individual's constitutional rights, without
requiring state action. 55 Jones was argued before the FHA was
passed 56 but decided afterward,57 and the Court had to reconcile
the fact that there were now two federal civil rights statutes that
dealt with housing rights. Jones resolved the potential conflict by
58
holding that both operate independently.
On March 1, 1968, the Kerner Commission released its report
on the causes and solutions to the violent race riots that had swept
the country's cities the previous summer. 59 The report stated, in
no uncertain terms, that segregated housing was a primary cause
of the social unrest 60 and that the United States was "moving
toward becoming two societies, one black, one white." 61 One of the
Kerner Commission's principal recommendations was to call for
62
the passage of a fair housing law.

nationalities into neighborhoods if it would lower property values. MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 35, at 37. This ethical gem remained in force until 1970.
Id.
51. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 409 (1968) (holding
that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to allow § 1981 and
§ 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to reach wholly private conduct-a
significant change in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
52. Pub. L. 90-284, Title VIII, § 801, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 81.
53. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, sec. 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by § 18 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870; Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, sec. 18, 16 Stat. 140,
144, and codified in §§ 1977, 1978 of the Revised statutes of 1874, now 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.
54. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
55. Id.
56. Jones was argued on April 1 & 2, 1968. Id. at 409.
57. Jones was decided on June 17, 1968. Id.
58. Id. at 416-17. Justice Stewart found "vast differences" between § 1982
and the FHA. Id. Section 1982 only covers racial discrimination and requires
private enforcement, while the FHA is "applicable to a broad range of
discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal
authority." Id.
59. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
60. The bipartisan commission stated the matter bluntly regarding racial
segregation in housing: "[wihat white Americans have never fully understood
-but
what the Negro can never forget-is that white society is deeply
implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions
maintain it, and white society condones it." Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id. at 27-28.
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In the context of this history of housing discrimination and
segregation as well as the subsequent efforts to find a legal
solution to the problem, it is just as important to note what the
Supreme Court has not said in the area of housing rights.
Generally, the Supreme Court must find that a fundamental
right 63 or a suspect class 64 has been implicated before the Court
will apply heightened review of governmental policies. 65 Housing
66
is not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment,
although the right to establish a home is. 6 7 Also, poverty,
homelessness, and disability are not suspect classes under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 68 There is, however, a fundamental right
to free association implicit in the First Amendment. 69 These
holdings highlight the boundaries of any legal remedy to
segregated housing. While the Warren Court found public school
segregation to be an Equal Protection violation warranting an

63. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fundamental right" as:
A significant component of liberty, encroachments of which are
rigorously tested by courts to ascertain the soundness of purported
A fundamental right triggers strict
governmental justifications.
scrutiny to determine whether the law violates the Due Process Clause
or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. As enunciated
by the Supreme Court, fundamental rights include voting, interstate
travel, and various aspects of privacy (such as marriage and
contraception rights).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 697 (8th ed. 2004).
64. Black's Law Dictionary defines "suspect classification" as "[a] statutory
classification based on race, national origin, or alienage, and thereby subject to
strict scrutiny under equal-protection analysis." Id. at 1487.
65. Black's Law Dictionary defines "strict scrutiny" as "[tihe standard
applied to suspect classifications (such as race) in equal-protection analysis
and to fundamental rights (such as voting rights) in due-process analysis.
Under strict scrutiny, the state must establish that it has a compelling
interest that justifies and necessitates the law in question." Id. at 1462.
Justice Stone set the stage in 1938 for the later development of the concept of
"strict scrutiny" in his famous "footnote four" from a case about interstate
commerce, when he wrote that "more exacting judicial scrutiny" may be
required when legislation appears to encroach on fundamental liberties or
United States v. Carolene
affect only "discrete and insular minorities."
Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
66. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that housing is
not a fundamental right).
67. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (deciding that the
right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" were fundamental
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
68. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985) (listing recognized suspect classes as race, alienage, or national origin,
and recognized quasi-suspect classes as: gender and illegitimacy, but declining
to extent to further disadvantaged groups).
69. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (recognizing a right to
free association in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
implicitly incorporating the First Amendment).
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affirmative mandate that public schools desegregate, 70 no such
71
order with regards to private residential housing is forthcoming.
B. A Brief History of the FairHousingAct
Before analyzing the ambiguous language of the FHA as it
pertains to post-acquisition discrimination, a short overview of the
passage of the FHA is pertinent. This review will include the
legislative history of the FHA and the state of the FHA today.
1.

Legislative History of the OriginalFHA

At the outset, it is important to note that the FHA was passed
under strained and extraordinary circumstances. 72 As a result,
traditional reliance on legislative history as a window into what
Congress intended is difficult at best. 73 Fair housing legislation
that would expand on what President Kennedy ordered in 196274
75
was not included in the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Subsequent efforts at enacting fair housing legislation also failed
in 196676 and 1967. 77 The stalemate was broken in 1968 primarily

70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II),
(mandating the desegregation of public schools as the remedy for the violation
found in Brown I: that racially segregated schools violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
71. The Supreme Court recently rejected two public school policies that
used racial classifications to promote racial balance, which is impermissible
under the Court's current equal protection jurisprudence. Parents Involved in
Comty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2755 (2007). The
Seattle school district argued that it needed the racially based school
assignment policy to "address the consequences of racially identifiable housing
patterns." Id. at 2758. The Court rejected this argument, noting that
"accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society." Id. at 2757.
Without explicitly referring to segregated housing, it is clear by inference that
the current Court will not mandate any form of housing desegregation
pursuant to the United States Constitution.
72. See infra notes 78-80 (recounting the circumstances under which the
FHA was enacted).
73. "[S]ince Title VIII was enacted substantially unchanged from the way it
was first introduced by Senator Dirksen on the floor of the Senate, its
legislative history does not include the committee reports and other
documents that usually accompany major legislation." SCHWEMM, supra note
17, at 5-6; see also infra note 81-82 (discussing the difficulty of using
legislative intent with the FHA).
74. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (Nov. 20, 1962).
75. The word "housing' does not appear in the 1964 Act. Leonard S.
Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Housing and the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 48 How. L.J. 841, 874 n.2 (2005).
76. President Johnson submitted fair housing legislation to Congress in
1966, S. 3296 and H.R. 14765, the House passed it, but it was filibustered and
died in the Senate. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 5-2 to -3.
77. President Johnson again called for a fair housing bill in 1967, but the
House Judiciary Committee reported out a civil rights bill not pertaining to
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because of three events: (1) the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.;78 (2) the tumultuous aftermath of Dr. King's death; 79 and
0
(3) the release of the Kerner Commission Report.8
The legislative history of the FHA is not particularly helpful
in analyzing whether coverage of post-acquisition housing
discrimination was intended.8 1 While it is true that the Act does
not use language that expressly prohibits post-acquisition
discrimination,8 2 the broad congressional intent was to integrate
American society, not just to end housing discrimination.8 3
2. FHA Amendments and HUD Regulations
The first important amendment to the FHA included sex as a
protected class in 1974.84 The next major amendment was in

fair housing ("H.R. 2516"). Id. The House passed H.R. 2516, but the full
Senate did not consider it in 1967. Id. Yet, H.R. 2516 was the genesis of a
federal fair housing bill because when H.R. 2516 came before the Senate in
February 1968, Senators Mondale and Brook sponsored a fair housing
amendment to the bill. Id. But even after switching the Mondale amendment
with a compromise fair housing bill offered by Senator Dirksen, the Senate
filibuster remained until the release of the Kerner Commission Report. Id.
78. "Martin Luther King's assassination in the evening of April 4th
accomplished one thing: it dislodged the Civil Rights Bill of 1968 from the
[House] Rules Committee."
Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A
Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L. J. 149, 160 (1969).
79. On April 10, 1968, "with National Guard troops called up to meet riot
conditions in Washington still in the basement of the Capitol, the House
debated fair housing." Id. No additional amendments were allowed and
debate was limited to one hour. Id.
80. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
The Kerner
Commission Report is important to the legislative history of the FHA because
"[t]hree days after release of the Commission's report, the Senate voted cloture
on the filibuster blocking the Dirksen proposal." SCWHEMM, supra note 17, at
5-5.
81. "[A] fair reading of the FHA's voluminous legislative history does not
unequivocally resolve" [the post-acquisition question],
and although
"[g]uaranteeing nondiscriminatory access was certainly a fundamental part of
the solution . . . discussions about fair housing legislation never limited the
law's scope to access." Short, supra note 24, at 239.
82. While the phrase "post-acquisition" does not appear in the FHA,
commentators disagree with Judge Posner that the FHA shows no concern
with anything but access: "the statutory language . . . demonstrates that
Congress must have intended the FHA to address housing disputes beyond
simple denials of accommodation." Short, supra note 24, at 221; see also infra
Part III(E) (analyzing the language of the FHA in the post-acquisition
context).
83. 114 CONG. REC. 2, 2276 (1968). The Trafficante Court quoted and
adopted Senator Mondale's statement on integration being the goal of the
FHA. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211.
84. 1974 amendment, Pub. L. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1974). The
FHA's ban on sex discrimination in housing means "housing suppliers must
lease, sell, and negotiate with women on the same basis as they do with
similarly situated men." SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11C-2.
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1988, when the FHA was substantially altered at its twentieth
anniversary.8 5
The Amendments added two more protected
classes: "familial status '8 6 and "handicapped."8 7 The Amendments
also created a new administrative enforcement mechanism for
handling housing
discrimination
complaints,
giving the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's ("HUD")
administrative law judges the power to award damages and
impose injunctions for FHA violations.8 8
HUD is the primary federal agency responsible for enforcing
the FHA.89 HUD is authorized and required to promulgate
regulations interpreting and implementing the FHA. 90
HUD
regulations, which protect occupants from post-acquisition
discrimination, exist 91 and are to be accorded great weight by
92
federal courts.
Analyzing the ambiguous language of the FHA and Halprin
in Part III will help determine whether the FHA as written is
susceptible to a post-acquisition reach.

85. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619-39 (1988) (the Amendments and the unaltered portions of the original
Act are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006)).
86. The FIA defines "familial status," in pertinent part, as meaning "one or
more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled
with... a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or
individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2006).
87. Under the FHA, "handicapped" is defined in part as a person having "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2006).
88. HUD enforcement provisions at 42 U.S.C. § 3610-12 (2006). One
commentator summarized the goal of the amended enforcement procedures:
[T]he basic purpose of the 1988 Act's reformation of the HUD procedure
was to provide an administrative enforcement system for persons
aggrieved by discriminatory housing practices that would handle
complaints quickly, easily, and inexpensively and would include "teeth"
in the form of serious sanctions against violators and substantial
remedies for complainants.
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 24-7; id. at 24-2 to -3 (summarizing the HUD
enforcement changes brought by the 1988 Amendments).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2006).
91. "Since 1989, HUD regulations interpreting § 3604(b) have identified a
number of practices barred by this provision that affect current residents."
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 14-9. HUD regulations prohibit "[flailing or
delaying maintenance or repairs . .. because of [a protected class]." 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.65(b)(2) (2007). HUD regulations also proscribe "[1]imiting the use of
privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling because of [a
protected class]." 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2007).
92. HUD's determination that Petitioner's had standing to sue was
"entitled to great weight." Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210. "Deference must be
given to these interpretive regulations, so long as they do not violate the plain
meaning of the statute and are a 'permissible' or 'reasonable' construction of
the law." SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 7-13.
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III. WHETHER THE CURRENT FHA APPLIES POST-ACQUISITION:
HALPRIN'S NEGATIVE ANSWER WARRANTS SCRUTINY

A. How Prevalent is Post-Acquisition Housing Discrimination?
Currently, there are no known quantitative studies
documenting the frequency of post-acquisition discrimination. 93
The number of federal court cases where the alleged
discrimination occurred during occupancy suggests that it is a
common occurrence, 94 but a more accurate estimate would be
95
useful both to this discussion and to the fair housing bar.
The John Marshall Law School operates The John Marshall
Law School Fair Housing Clinic ("JMLS Clinic"). 96 In pursuit of
quantitative information regarding the frequency of postacquisition claims, this author examined every intake form
generated by the JMLS Clinic between January 1, 2007, and
December 31, 2007. 97 The intakes were sorted into four categories:
(1) pre-acquisition claims; (2) post-acquisition claims; (3) not
applicable; and (4) unknown. 98 Current open cases at the JMLS

93. Professor Schwemm observed that he knew of no agency or organization
that distinguishes pre- and post-acquisition discrimination in their reporting,
and he knew of no studies examining this topic. Telephone Interview with
Robert G. Schwemm, Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law, in Lexington, Kentucky (Oct. 8, 2007).
94. See infra note 219 (listing cases where federal appellate courts found
post-acquisition discrimination actionable); supra note 28 (documenting other
federal cases where post-acquisition claims were upheld).
95. Professor Schwemm stated that an accurate statistical estimate of the
frequency of post-acquisition discrimination would be useful. Interview with
Robert G. Schwemm, supra note 93. Professor Caruso stated that an estimate
of the prevalence of post-acquisition housing discrimination would be "helpful
to the fair housing bar." Interview with F. Willis Caruso, Clinical Professor,
The John Marshall Law School, in Chicago, Illinois (Oct. 29, 2007).
96. The JMLS Clinic provides legal services to victims of housing
discrimination while also training law students in civil rights litigation
practice. Interview with F. Willis Caruso, supra note 95. The JMLS Clinic
receives hundreds of contacts each year, and an intake form is generated for
each contact. Id. If the legal problem is not something the JMLS Clinic can
help with, the person is referred to another legal agency. Id. The case may
involve housing discrimination, yet still be referred out, as the Clinical
professors running the JMLS Clinic need to take into account JMLS Clinic
resources and educational value to the students, alongside the merits of the
case. Id.
97. The author conducted this survey at the JMLS Clinic on December 11,
2007, and January 28, 2008, to capture intakes received after December lth.
Scott Gilbert, Survey of Post-Acquisition Claims at the JMLS Fair Housing
Clinic in 2007, January 28, 2008 (unpublished, on file with the author). A
total of 454 intakes were included. Id.
98. The pre-acquisition category is defined as those contacts where it is
clear from the face of the intake form that the alleged conduct involved
housing discrimination that occurred prior to the person obtaining the
property in question. Id. The post-acquisition category is defined as those
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Clinic were also sorted into three categories: (1) pre-acquisition; (2)
post-acquisition; and (3) not applicable. 99
The results were striking. Of the fifty-four open cases at the
JMLS Clinic in 2007, twenty-four are post-acquisition claims,
nineteen are pre-acquisition claims, and eleven are not
applicable. 100 Post-acquisition claims constitute forty-four percent
of the JMLS Clinic's open cases, 10 1 and fifty-six percent of the
JMLS Clinic's cases which were being actively litigated at that
time. 10 2 Of the 454 intakes received by the JMLS Clinic in 2007,
The "not
fourteen percent are post-acquisition claims.103
applicable" category should arguably be removed from this tally
because it contains numerous intakes not related to housing
discrimination at all. 10 4 Excluding the "not applicable" intakes
means that post-acquisition claims comprise thirty-eight percent
of the JMLS Clinic's housing discrimination intakes in 2007.105 If
only the pre- and post-acquisition intakes are compared, the result
speaks for itself: sixty-eight percent of the housing discrimination
complaints made to the JMLS Clinic in 2007 were post-acquisition
10 6
innature.
Discrimination after the transaction is clearly frequent
enough to warrant an exploration as to whether the current FHA
prohibits such conduct as written.
contacts where it is clear from the face of the intake form that the alleged
conduct occurred after the person obtained the property. Id. The "not
applicable" ("N/A") category is defined as contacts where the legal problem
does not appear to be a housing discrimination issue, at least not from the face
of the intake form. Id. Finally, the "unknown" category is defined as contacts
that cannot be classified at all from the face of the intake form (for various
reasons including: (1) the caller did not give enough information, or (2) the
student intern did not describe the alleged conduct adequately). Id.
99. As of December 11, 2007, the Clinic had fifty-four open cases. A fourth
category for unknown cases was not needed to sort the open cases, as there is
enough information on file at the Clinic to classify every open case. Id.
100. Id. For open cases, the not applicable category encompasses cases that
are: (1) settled but not finalized; (2) currently inactive but not formally closed;
or (3) consolidated with other open cases. Id.
101. Twenty-four out of fifty-four equals forty-four percent. Id.
102. Eleven Clinic cases were not active in 2007. Id. Twenty-four out of
forty-three equals fifty-six percent. Id.
103. Sixty-five out of 454 equals fourteen percent. Id.
104. The not applicable category contains 282 intakes, and it includes calls
about divorce, criminal matters, landlord tenant disputes, etc., that do not
implicate the FHA. Id.
105. The actual percentage may be even higher, as the "unknown" category
contained seventy-six intakes, the majority of which are likely unrelated to
housing discrimination (but this could not be confirmed for the stated reason
that the intake contained insufficient information). Id. Subtracting both the
"N/A's" and the "unknown" intakes leaves ninety-six intakes, of which sixtyeight percent were post-acquisition in nature. Id.
106. When both the "N/A's" and the "unknowns" are excluded, it leaves sixtyfive post-acquisition intakes and thirty-one pre-acquisition intakes. Id.
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B. Legislative Intent Behind the FHA: Not too Helpful
While Judge Posner may be superficially correct in saying
that the FHA's drafters were primarily concerned with access to
housing and not occupancy, 10 7 the Supreme Court10 8 and other
commentators disagree that the FHA's focus was so narrow. 10 9
As previously discussed in Part I(B), the legislative history of
the FHA provides little assistance toward resolving the postacquisition question.110
What is clear, however, is that the
primary sponsors of the bill spoke of two goals: ending housing
discrimination and integrating America's residential housing.1 '
While Congress did not appear to think that merely ending
housing discrimination would directly lead to integration, it did
see the denial of access as a major obstacle to achieving
integration. 112 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the
first Supreme Court case to interpret the FHA, reached the same
conclusion that Congress intended to both end housing
discrimination and foster integration. 13
Trafficante is also pertinent because a unanimous Supreme
Court held the FHA was to be construed broadly by giving it a
"generous construction"" 4 because, according to the Court,
Congress considered it to be of the "highest priority." 115 It hardly
seems logical, therefore, that Congress would pass a law affording
access to housing in order to facilitate integration, while at the
same time contemplating that such a law would not protect the
6
owner or renter once in possession.1
107. In Halprin,Judge Posner stated that "[t]he Fair Housing Act contains
no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern with
anything but access to housing." Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
108. "The legislative history of the [FHA] is not too helpful." Trafficante, 409
U.S. at 209.
109. "It is not at all clear that the 1968 Congress' focus was as narrow as
Halprin imagines." SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 14-13 n.10. "[P]assage of the
FHA did not involve thoughtful, meticulous drafting or consideration of the
statute's language." Short, supra note 24, at 224.
110. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (examining the chaotic
circumstances of the FHA's passage and the low value, this history provides,
when searching for legislative intent behind the FHA).
111. Senator Mondale wanted to replace America's ghettos with "balanced
and integrated" housing patterns. 114 CONG. REC. 2, 2276 (1968).
112. Senator Mondale admitted in floor debate that "fair housing by itself
will not move a single Negro into the suburbs-the laws of economics will
determine that." Id. at 3422. Prohibiting discrimination, however, will at
least provide an opportunity for integration. Id.
113. 409 U.S. at 211 (quoting and adopting Senator Mondale's statement on
integration being the goal of the FHA).
114. Id. at 212.
115. Id. at 211.
116. "[I]t is difficult to imagine a privilege that flows more naturally from
the purchase or rental of a dwelling than the privilege of residing therein."
United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004).
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C. Compare the FHA to § 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 1866117 provides inferential evidence
of whether the Ninetieth Congress intended the FHA to cover
occupancy and not just the real estate transaction.11s Unlike the
FHA, § 1982 expressly protects occupancy by establishing the
right "to hold" property. 119 Section 1982 is also narrower than the
FHA because it is limited to racial discrimination.1 20 Also, when
the FHA was passed, before Jones had been decided, § 1982 did
22
not yet reach private conduct. 21 Despite these limitations,
§ 1982 does cover racially-based housing discrimination that
occurs long after the sale or rental. 123 If Judge Posner is right
about Congressional intent regarding the FHA, then an anomaly
results: a broad fair housing law enacted in 1968 was actually
intended to have a much shorter reach than a narrow racial
discrimination law enacted in 1866.124
D. Compare the FHA to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
The FHA has often been compared to Title VII of the 1964
25
Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination.
117. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, sec. 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by sec. 18 of
the Enforcement Act of 1870; Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, sec. 18, 16 Stat.
140, 144, and codified in §§ 1977, 1978 of the Revised statutes of 1874, now 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (2006).
118. The inference goes like this: when the FHA was passed, § 1982 was not
yet applicable to private action, but it did cover post-acquisition
discrimination. Therefore, Congress intended the new FHA to rectify this gap
by reaching private action, while retaining the post-acquisition reach of its
predecessor. Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights
of Occupants Under the FairHousing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
2829 (2008).
119. Section 1982 states, "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). "Numerous cases have held that § 1982's
"right to hold" is violated by discrimination directed at in-place residents."
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 14-15.
120. Section 1982 "deals only with racial discrimination and does not
address itself to discrimination on grounds of religion or national origin."
Jones, 392 U.S at 413.
121. See id. at 439 (comparing Jones decision date of June 17, 1968, with
FHA passage date of April 8, 1968, to confirm that § 1982 did not reach
private conduct until after the FHA was enacted).
122. See SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11-1 (tallying the seven protected
classes in the FHA).
Compare this to § 1982, which only prohibits
discrimination based on race. Jones, 392 U.S at 413.
123. "[Section] 1982 has always contained specific language indicating that
its guarantee of nondiscriminatory treatment is intended to extend beyond
purchase or lease to include the 'hold' stage of a housing transaction."
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 27-12.
124. Id. at 14-14 to -15.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
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The Trafficante Court looked to Title VII, passed just four years
analogy how broadly to define
before the126FHA, to decide by
"standing" under the FHA.127 Lower courts have looked to Title
128
VII caselaw when interpreting the FHA ever since.
It is settled caselaw that Title VII protects the job holder, as
well as the job seeker from discrimination; not even Judge Posner
disputes this.129 Similar language in the FHA and Title VII has
led many courts and commentators to make the analogy that the
FHA protects housing "holders" as well as housing seekers from
discrimination. 130
Having looked to two other prominent federal civil rights
statutes for guidance on occupancy rights, an examination of the
language of the FHA is warranted before moving on to analyze
Halprin.
E.

What the FHA Actually Prohibits,Ambiguities and All

Although the FHA encompasses §§ 3601-3619 and § 3631, the
main substantive provisions defining prohibited conduct under the
FHA are contained within § 3604, § 3605, § 3606, and § 3617.131 In
fact, the FHA defines a "discriminatory housing practice" as
126. In an early FHA case, the Supreme Court defined standing as "whether
the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute," and
that "[t]his inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The constitutional aspect is whether the plaintiff "has
made out a 'case or controversy' between himself and the defendant within the
meaning of Art. III." Id.
127. The Trafficante Court found that because both Title VII and the FHA
define an aggrieved person as one who has claimed to be injured by a
discriminatory practice, and that where such language in Title VII shows a
congressional intent to define standing as broadly as allowed under Article III,
such broad standing applied to the FHA as well. 409 U.S. at 209.
128. Other than the issue of standing, another prominent example of the
FHA borrowing from Title VII precedent is with the disparate impact theory of
discrimination. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 7-4. In 1971, the Court first
interpreted Title VII to allow employment discrimination claims based on
disparate impact, where there is no showing of intentional discrimination.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 432 (1971). In 1977, the Seventh
Circuit, by analogy to Title VII, allowed a disparate impact claim of housing
discrimination to proceed against a municipality. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
129. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
130. One commentator who examined the parallels between Title VII and
the FHA documented the extensive fair housing case law where Title VII was
used to support a post-acquisition reach of the FHA. Short, supra note 24, at
Professor Short concluded that the nearly identical statutory
241-43.
language made it hard to justify recognizing post-hiring claims under Title VII
while rejecting post-acquisition claims under the FHA. Id.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006). The "substantive heart" of the
FHA is in the prohibitions within these four sections. SCHWEMM, supra note
17, at 4-4.
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conduct that is unlawful under these four sections. 132 The basic
formula for finding an FHA violation is to determine: (1) if a
"dwelling"'133 is involved; (2) if a "protected class"'134 is involved; (3)
if a "discriminatory housing practice"1 35 has occurred; and (4)
136
whether an exception applies.
A major ambiguity in the FHA, unrelated to the postacquisition debate, is whether housing discrimination must be
intentional. 37 In order to violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination must be intentional. 38
Under the FHA, however, courts have accepted disparate impact
claims, drawn by analogy from Title VII employment
discrimination case law. 39
The intentional discrimination
controversy is another topic unto itself but is worth noting here
140
because it is also ripe for congressional intervention.
It is not necessary to document every housing-related practice
that is prohibited under the FHA, but each substantive section
will be briefly analyzed to determine how it applies generally, as
well as whether it applies in the post-acquisition scenario.

132. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006) (defining a "dwelling"); see also
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 4-4 (relating that FHA protection is limited to
dwellings).
134. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11-1.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (defining a "discriminatory housing practice").
136. A full examination of the available FHA exceptions is outside the range
of this Comment, but a good example is the statutory so-called 'Mrs. Murphy
exception," where a private homeowner renting no more than three rooms out
of her own home is exempt from the prohibitions of the FHA, so long as she
does not use real estate professionals or advertise the rental. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b)(2) (2006); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 9-3 (summarizing the
exceptions to the FHA). Where an exception may be applicable, it is important
to note, however, that FHA exceptions are to be construed narrowly. United
States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1990)
(determining that where the body of the statute is construed broadly, it is a
natural corollary to construe the exceptions narrowly).
137. There are different standards of proof for different sections of the FHA,
but several sections, including § 3604(a) and § 3604(b), define unlawful
conduct as some prohibited conduct done "because of' a protected class.
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 10-1. The meaning of "because of' is not defined
in the FHA, and the Supreme Court has not resolved this dispute. Id.
138. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (holding that proof of intentional racial discrimination must be shown
to establish an equal protection violation).
139. See supra Part III(D) (exploring the relationship between the FHA and
Title VII, and the use of Title VII precedent by analogy in fair housing cases).
140. Congress could also amend the FHA to statutorily provide for a
disparate impact cause of action to prevent a hostile Supreme Court from
judicially revoking the doctrine.
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Section 3604

Section 3604 of the FHA contains six subparts, (a) through
Each subpart will be examined with a focus on whether the
subsection could be construed to protect occupancy rights.
(f).141

a.

Section 3604(a)

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent...
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of ... a dwelling...
because" a person is part of a "protected class." 142 After this
explicitly stated prohibited conduct, § 3604(a) also contains a
catch-all phrase prohibiting conduct that would "otherwise make
unavailable or deny" housing to a protected class. 143 Courts have
construed this "otherwise deny" language to prohibit a wide range
of discriminatory practices not amounting to outright refusals to
deal or negotiate. 144 Federal courts have interpreted the § 3604(a)
catchall "otherwise make unavailable" clause to prohibit
discrimination directed at current occupants of dwellings and not
145
just those seeking housing.
b.

Section 3604(b)

Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful to discriminate "in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,"
because a person is part of a protected class. 146 There is an active
controversy over the proper interpretation of the "in connection
147
therewith" phrase.

141. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) - § 3604 (f) (2006).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
143. Id.
144. Delaying tactics, more burdensome procedures, or other attempts to
avoid dealing with a protected class member amounts to a § 36049(a) violation
as much as an outright refusal. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 13-2. The catchall "otherwise deny" phrase is broad; but to come within § 3604(a),
discriminatory conduct must "deny housing or negatively affect its
availability." Id. Some of the other discriminatory practices held to be
prohibited by § 3604(a) include racial steering, exclusionary zoning, mortgage
redlining, and discriminatory property appraisals. Id. at 13-1.
145. While acknowledging that not every complaint would be severe enough
to find that housing had been made "unavailable" under § 3604(a), one
commentator proposes leaving that determination to the finder of fact. Short,
supra note 24, at 215. Professor Short explains that "there is no textual
reason to categorically reject the viability of harassment claims under
§ 3604(a) simply because such claims might occur post-acquisition." Id.

146. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006).
147. See Short, supra note 24, at 209 (indicating the debate over the proper
way to read § 3604(b)-narrowly or broadly); Robert G. Schwemm, Cox,
Halprin, and DiscriminatoryMunicipal Services Under the FairHousing Act,
41 IND. L. REV. 717, 769-71 (2008) (acknowledging the broad versus narrow
debate, before examining the clause and concluding that either reading is
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The broad reading would use the "in connection therewith"
148
phrase to link the "provision of services" phrase with dwelling,
an interpretation that naturally opens the door to post-acquisition
claims. 149 The narrow reading would link the "provision of
services" phrase with the sale or rental, 150 and not dwelling. This
constricted interpretation would appear to limit the use of
§ 3604(b) to discrimination that occurs during the sale or rental
transaction. 151
c.

Section 3604(c)

Section 3604(c) prohibits statements or advertisements that
express a preference based on a protected class. 152 Despite this
section containing the phrase "with respect to the sale or rental," it
is applicable in some post-acquisition situations, such as where a
landlord makes discriminatory statements to a current tenant. 53
d.

Section 3604(d)

Section 3604(d) prohibits anyone from representing that
housing is not available, when in fact it is available. 154 This
section has essentially been absorbed by § 3604(a)'s "otherwise
make unavailable" clause, 155 except for "testers,"'156 who have
standing to sue based on § 3604(d). 157 This section is not relevant
to the post-acquisition discussion.

grammatically incorrect, and should not be the basis for denying postacquisition claims).
148. The broad reading is supported by numerous HUD regulations, which
have recognized that § 3604(b)'s "in connection therewith" phrase refers to the
dwelling and not the transaction. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 14-3.
149. HUD regulations, courts, and commentators had assumed that
§ 3604(b) did not just protect homeseekers from discrimination but protected
their right to equal treatment once they occupied the dwelling. Id.
150. Halprin appeared to implicitly rely on the narrow reading of § 3604(b)
by stating that the section is only concerned with discrimination that prevents
people from acquiring property. 388 F.3d at 328-29. When the Fifth Circuit
followed the Seventh, it expressly held that the statute required a narrow
reading of § 3604(b). Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005).
151. Short, supra note 24, at 209.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
153. Oliveri, supra note 117, at 11.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2006).
155. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 16-1.
156. In the fair housing context, "testers" are people who pose as renters or
purchasers, where they do not really intend to rent or buy, in order to collect
evidence of housing discrimination. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 373 (1982).
157. Id. at 373-74.
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Section 3604(e)

Section 3604(e) makes it unlawful "[flor profit, to induce or
attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by
representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the
neighborhood of a person or persons of a [protected class]." 158 This
section outlaws a practice called "blockbusting," where the
allegedly changing character of a neighborhood is used to frighten
people into leaving or not entering a neighborhood. 159 Section
3604(e) reaches post-acquisition discrimination, such as when
blockbusting is employed against current homeowners to scare
them into selling.160
f.

Section 3604(f)

Section 3604(f) is a subsection added to the FHA in 1988,161
extending FHA protection to the disabled. 162 The language used in
§§ 3604()(1) and (f)(2) largely tracks with the language used in
§ 3604(a) and § 3604(b), respectively, 163 and affords the same
protections as those sections.16 4 Relevant to this discussion,
however, are several provisions relating to disability that clearly
protect occupancy rights.
Sections 3604(f)(1) and (f)(2) expand the protections afforded
beyond the disabled individual to "a person residing in or
intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or
165
made available; or ...any person associated with that person."
158. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2006).
159. The practices prohibited in § 3604(e) are generally referred to as
"blockbusting." SCHWEMM, supra note 17, 17-1 n.2. Section 3604(e) makes it
unlawful: "[f]or profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into
the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2006).
160. See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 118 (5th
Cir. 1973) (upholding blockbusting claim where prohibited conduct was
directed at homeowners in possession of their homes).
161. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (1988); SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11D:3.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (2006). The other two federal statutes that ban
discrimination based on disability, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, use the term "disability" in a way
that is synonymous with the phrase "handicap" as used in the FHA.
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11-D:I. For purposes of this discussion, the two
terms are to be considered interchangeable.
163. The language of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) was copied almost exactly over
to § 3604(0(1) and § 3604(0(2) respectively. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at
11D:3. The reason these rights for disabled persons were separated from the
other protected classes was to make clear that housing made available only for
the disabled was lawful. Id.
164. Id. at 13-1, 14-1.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and (f)(2) (2006). This also means it is illegal to
deny housing to a person because someone associated with the prospective
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The key language is "residing in," clearly expressing a legislative
purpose to protect the disabled from discrimination after they
166
have taken possession of the dwelling.
Section 3604(f) also confers housing rights to the disabled not
available to the other protected
classes, such as the right to
"reasonable accommodations" 167 and "reasonable modifications."'168
This is a substantial and complex area of fair housing law in its
own right, but the important point for this Comment is that
§ 3604(f) confers extensive rights to disabled occupants of
dwellings. As one commentator has argued, Congress must accept
the post-acquisition reach of the FHA because when it was
amended in 1988, there had already been post-acquisition cases,
169
yet Congress chose not to write such conduct out of the Act.
2. Section 3605
Section 3605 prohibits discrimination against protected
classes in transactions related to residential real estate, including
loans and appraisals. 170 Germane to this discussion,
§ 3605(b)(1)(A) provides that this section does not just cover loans
for buying or building homes, but also for "improving, repairing, or
maintaining a dwelling."'17
The chosen language expresses a
design to prohibit post-acquisition loan discrimination because one
ordinarily would not improve, repair, or maintain a dwelling in

renter had a disability. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11D:2.
166. Short, supra note 24, at 217. See id. at 217 n.101 (collecting cases
recognizing a post-acquisition scope of disability discrimination under
§ 3604(f)).
167. Section 3604(f)(3)(B) defines a refusal to "make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling' as discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2006).
"Reasonable accommodations" are feasible and practical changes that do not
fundamentally alter the defendant's program or impose undue financial and
administrative burdens. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11D:8. The elements
for a reasonable accommodation claim are: (1) the request must be reasonable;
(2) the plaintiff must be handicapped; (3) the defendant knew or should have
known about the handicap; (4) the accommodation may be "necessary;" and (5)
the accommodation was denied. Id.
168. Section 3604(f)(3)(A) defines "discrimination" as a "refusal to permit, at
the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing
premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may
be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(3)(A) (2006). The elements of a reasonable modification claim are: (1)
the tenant asked permission of the landlord to make modifications at her
expense; (2) the tenant is disabled; (3) the modifications may be necessary to
afford the tenant full enjoyment of the premises; and (4) the landlord refused
the modification. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 11D:7.
169. Oliveri, supra note 118, at 32.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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which they had no property interest. 172
3. Section 3617
Section 3617 makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with" rights defined in § 3603, § 3604,
§ 3605, or § 3606.173 Such coercion is a violation under three
circumstances: (1) when a person exercises or enjoys his own
housing rights; 174 (2) when a person has exercised his housing
rights in the past; 175 and (3) when a person has "aided or
encouraged" another in the exercise of that person's housing
rights. 176
A broad reading of § 3617, by reference to the language alone,
would accord weight to the past tense language used. 177 Logically,
current interference with housing rights that were exercised in the
past would likely involve interference directed at current
78
occupants of housing.I
A narrow reading of § 3617 would in essence ignore the past
tense language and focus on the requirement that the interference
179
be related to one of the other substantive provisions of the FHA.
Because the other provisions relate to sales and rentals, so the
logic goes, there can be no violation of § 3617 without a sale or
8 0
rental transaction.
Federal courts are not the only branch of government to have
weighed in on the meaning of § 3617, however, as HUD has issued
regulations defining § 3617181 that are to be accorded great

172. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 18:2.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
174. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 20:2.

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see also Short, supra note 24, at 218 (arguing that the use of past
tense language means that the real estate transaction in question is not
prospective).
178. Reading § 3617 to reach post-acquisition claims would satisfy the
requirement that a violation of § 3617 be tied to the rights granted by the FHA
because the right to acquire a home free from discrimination was exercised in
the past by a current occupant facing discrimination. Short, supra note 24, at
218.
179. Some courts have read § 3617 to require a current violation of § 3604 or
§ 3605 in order to find a § 3617 violation. Oliveri, supra note 118 at 12. See
Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting a § 3617 claim
where there was no current violation of any right conferred by the other
substantive provisions of the FHA because then § 3617 had no "predicate").
180. Judge Posner, in Halprin,seemed to prefer the narrow reading of
§ 3617, noting that the lack of a § 3604 violation might "doom" the § 3617
claim as well, before reluctantly deferring to a HUD regulation on point. 388
F.3d at 330.
181. See 24 C.F.R. 100.400 (2007) (interpreting unlawful conduct under
§ 3617 of the FHA, promulgated by HUD).
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weight.18 2 HUD regulation 100.400(c)(2) goes beyond the language
of the FHA, providing that "enjoyment of a dwelling" is protected
from the conduct prohibited in § 3617, i.e., coercion, interference,
or intimidation.18 3 Enjoyment of one's dwelling clearly extends
184
past acquisition and into occupancy.
4.

Section 3631

Section 3631 is generally considered part of the FHA, even
though it was initially passed as part of Title IX of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act and not Title VIII.185 Section 3631 criminalizes the use
or threat of force that violates housing rights of a protected class
member.18 6 Unlike § 3617, however, § 3631 provides its own list of
18 7
housing rights that trigger criminal sanctions when violated.
Material to this discussion is that § 3631(a) expressly protects
occupants of dwellings from violence or interference because of
protected class status.188
Prior to Halprin,the general consensus among federal courts
and fair housing commentators was that post-acquisition
discrimination was prohibited in a number of contexts. 8 9 Before
proposing an FHA amendment that would expressly protect
occupancy, an analysis of Halprin'sreasoning is necessary.
F.

The HalprinDecision

As a threshold matter, it is important to note that both the
original Halprin district court opinion1 90 and the Halprin Seventh
Circuit opinion 1 91 were decided on the defendant's motion to
dismiss. 1 92 The procedural disposition of the case means that both

182. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 and SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 7-13
(justifying the deference to be given HUD regulations).
183. 24 C.F.R. 100.400(c)(2) (2007).
184. Short, supra note 24, at 217-18.
185. Id. at 220.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2006).
187. Section 3631 prohibits interference with protected class members who
engage in "selling, purchasing, renting, financing, occupying, or contracting or
negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, financing or occupation of any
dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a).
188. The use of the word "occupying" meant Congress intended to prohibit
interference with persons already in possession. Short, supra note 24, at 220.
See also id., 220 n.123 (listing cases recognizing post-possession § 3617
claims).
189. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (exploring the general
consensus before Halprin that post-acquisition housing discrimination is
prohibited by the FHA in numerous contexts).
190. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 899-900 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
191. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 328.
192. For purposes of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is required to assume the factual
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the trial court and the appellate court accepted as true the
Halprins' allegations that they were the victims of a pattern of
housing discrimination because of their religion. 193 Nevertheless,
the courts went on to hold as a matter of law that the FHA did not
prohibit such conduct. 194 This was not a case where the facts were
in dispute or where the plaintiff could not provide some proof of
the conduct alleged, as would be required at the summary
judgment stage. 195 Rather, these were court interpretations that
even where housing discrimination was aimed at a protected class,
the FHA was not implicated because the conduct occurred after the
dwelling was acquired. 196
1. Halprin I- The FirstDistrict Court Case
The Halprins brought their case to federal court, alleging
violations of §§ 3604(a), (b), (c), and § 3617.197 After finding no
allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs favor. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
193. Plaintiffs, Robyn Halprin ("Robyn") and Rick Halprin ("Rick"), owned a
home in The Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park subdivision
(hereinafter "Subdivision"). Id. at 898. Rick is Jewish. Id. The Subdivision
was managed by the defendant homeowners association: The Prairie Single
Family Homes of Dearborn Park Association (hereinafter "Association"). Id.
Conflict began in November 2000 when Robyn was not elected to the
Association Board and defendant Mark Ormond ("Ormond"), an Association
Board member, refused to disclose the number of proxy votes. Id. At some
point before January 10, 2001, Ormond vandalized the Halprin's home by
writing "H-town property" in red letters on a stone wall, which plaintiffs
alleged referred to "Hymie town," a place where Jewish people live. Id.
Ormond's vandalism included damaging trees and plants as well as tearing
down strings of holiday lights. Id. Robyn placed notices on public light poles
and trees, offering a reward for identifying the vandals. Id. Although not on
Association property, Ormond, nevertheless, removed the notices and
pressured the Association lawyer to press the City of Chicago to demand
removal of the notices. Id. On January 8, 2001, Ormond prevented Robyn
from speaking to the board about the Association. Id. One or more defendants
altered Board meeting minutes and destroyed a tape recording in order to
conceal the fact that Ormond had threatened to "make an example" of Robyn.
Id.
194. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
195. Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for
summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no
material facts in dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Summary judgment is not proper, however, if "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
196. See supra Part III(F)(1) (briefing the first Halprin district court
opinion); see supra Part III(F)(2) (examining the Halprin Seventh Circuit
opinion).
197. The Halprin district court ruled on the plaintiffs' § 3604(b), § 3604(c),
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violation of any provision of § 3604 because the conduct was not
related to the sale or rental of a dwelling, the district court also
dismissed the Halprins' § 3617 claim. 198 Because their § 3617
claim was based on the same underlying conduct as their § 3604
claim, the district court reasoned that dismissal of the § 3604
claim required the dismissal of the § 3617 one as well. 199
2. Halprin II-

The Seventh Circuit'sDecision

The Seventh Circuit's decision is not a model of clarity with
regards to which provision of the FHA is being applied to the facts,
200
and, at one point, both § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) are conflated.
Without dealing with § 3604(c) at all, the Seventh Circuit rejected
the Halprins' claims under § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) on the same
logic as the trial court: that the alleged discrimination occurred
201
after the plaintiffs had moved into their home.
Judge Posner, unlike the district court, acknowledged a
circumstance when § 3604 could be implicated post-possession:
where the conduct was severe enough to amount to "constructive
eviction." 20 2 But this seems to set the bar very high before § 3604
could be invoked during occupancy, essentially only when
20 3
occupancy was lost.
After affirming the dismissal of the § 3604 claim, 20 4 the
Seventh Circuit noted that the lack of a § 3604 claim might appear
"to doom their claim under § 3617 as well,"20 5 as the district court
thought. 20 6 But there is a HUD regulation that explains the
conduct prohibited by § 3617, and it includes the right to

and § 3617 claims. 208 F. Supp. 2d at 900. The district court rejected the
plaintiffs' § 3604(a) claim, however, ruling that it was not alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint and was therefore untimely. Id.
198. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 903-04.
199. Id.
200. At one point, Judge Posner referred to making a home "unavailable" (an
apparent reference to § 3604(a)) and then in the same sentence to "privileges
or services" (an apparent reference to § 3604(b)) without distinguishing the
two distinct FHA provisions. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
201. Further conflating § 3604(a) and § 3604(b), two FHA provisions
ordinarily dealt with separately, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs
had no claim under § 3604. Id.
202. Id; see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 594 (8th ed. 2004) (defining

"constructive eviction").
203. See Short, supra note 24, at 215 (arguing that it is for the fact-finder to
determine whether conduct was severe enough to violate the FHA).
Constructive eviction occurs where a landlord "has substantially deprived the
tenant of the beneficial use of the premises, or when the landlord's actions...
[are] so severe as to interfere with the tenant's peaceful enjoyment of the
premises." Honce, 1 F.3d at 1091.
204. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
205. Id.
206. Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 903-04.
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"enjoyment of a dwelling. '207
The HUD regulation clearly
authorizes a post-acquisition reach of § 3617, and as Judge Posner
observed, it "cuts § 3617 loose from § 3604, contrary to the
language of § 3617."208 The validity of the regulation was not
challenged by the defendant, so the Halprin court observed that it
could not rely on the apparent overreach of the regulation as a
route to affirming the dismissal. 209 After implicitly encouraging
future fair housing defendants to challenge the validity of HUD
regulation 100.400, the Seventh Circuit reinstated the Halprin's
210
§ 3617 claim and remanded.
3. Halprin III-Remanded Back to the District Court
On remand, the defendant again moved to dismiss, initially
challenging the validity of the relevant HUD regulation. 211 In the
intervening time, however, the Seventh Circuit had upheld the
validity of the regulation, 212 so the argument failed. 21 3 The
defendant next argued that the alleged conduct did not interfere
with the plaintiffs "enjoyment of a dwelling," but the court also
rejected this argument. 21 4 Finally, the court disagreed with the
argument that there was no evidence of a pattern of
harassment. 215 After four years of litigation, without even getting
to discovery, the district court ended its opinion with the
'21 6
admonition to end the "pleading wars.
4.

The Aftermath of Halprin

Other fair housing defendants have been quick to rely on
Halprin and argue that the FHA does not apply to post-acquisition
housing discrimination,
and some courts accept these
arguments. 217 Most significantly, the Fifth Circuit accepted
207. 24 C.F.R. 100.400(c)(2) (2007).
208. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 330-31.
211. Halprin, 2006 WL 2506223, at *1.
212. See East-Miller, 421 F.3d at 562 (upholding HUD regulation
100.400(c)(2) because its validity was not challenged); Farrar,137 F. App'x at
912 (assuming that even if the HUD regulation 100.400(c)(2) phrase
"enjoyment of a dwelling' could sever § 3617 from the rest of the FHA, there
was no violation in the case at bar).
213. Halprin, 2006 WL 2506223, at *1.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2.
217. See Bloch, 533 F.3d at 563-64 (agreeing with the Halprin court that the
FHA does not reach post-acquisition discrimination); Cox, 430 F.3d at 742-43,
745 (holding that in the Fifth Circuit neither § 3604(a) nor § 3604(b) was
violated where the alleged discriminatory conduct was not related to the sale
or rental of a dwelling); Krieman, 2006 WL 1519320, at *5 (following Halprin
by rejecting post-acquisition claim under § 3604(a)); Reule, 2005 WL 2669480,
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Halprin'sholding, and thus the rule that the FHA does not protect
occupancy is now binding precedent in the Seventh and Fifth
218
Circuits.
G. Compare Halprinto the Law in Other Circuits
In contrast to the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, eight other
federal circuits confronted with housing discrimination directed at
occupants have recognized the post-acquisition scope of the
FHA. 219 Although none of these cases deal directly with whether
the FHA extends to post-acquisition discrimination, they implicitly
endorse extending the FHA to protect occupancy by upholding
claims arising after the real estate transaction. 220 These cases

at *4 (dismissing a § 3617 claim after 'adopting' the Seventh Circuit view that
24 C.F.R. 100.400(c)(2) is invalid); Steele v. City of Port Wentworth, No.
CV405-135, 2008 WL 717813, at *12-13 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2008) (adopting the
narrow reading of § 3604(b) and holding that it does not reach post-acquisition
discrimination).
218. Cox, 430 F.3d at 742-43, 745; Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
219. See Hogar Agua Y Vida En El Desierto, Inc. v. Suarez-Medina, 36 F.3d
177, 179 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court ruling that an FHA
exception applied, accepting post-acquisition claims where the plaintiffs were
allegedly harassed after signing the rental agreement); Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding a disparate impact claim
brought by current tenants and accepting the post-acquisition reach of the
FHA); Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 229 (6th Cir. 2003)
(continuing the pattern that other Circuits followed before Halprin and
recognizing post-acquisition claims where some of the plaintiffs who alleged
familial status discrimination were present occupants); Neudecker, 351 F.3d at
364 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding a post-acquisition disability harassment cause
of action under the FHA because the harassment occurred during tenant's
occupancy); Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001)
(accepting the merits of the underlying FHA claim brought by tenants who
had already acquired their units when ruling on other matters); Honce, 1 F.3d
at 1090 (recognizing the hostile housing environment claim where the
harassment "alters the conditions of the housing arrangement," implying postpossession interference with occupancy); Woodard v. Fanboy, L.L.C., 298 F.3d
1261, 1263 (11th Cir. 2002) (accepting that post-acquisition familial status
discrimination is actionable by tenants); Clifton Terrace Assoc., Ltd. v. United
Tech. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting a third party claim,
while generally accepting § 3604(b) discriminatory service claims by housing
occupants).
220. Federal cases before Halprin did not explicitly discuss the temporal
scope of the FHA. See supra note 219 (compiling a roundup of the Federal
Circuits that recognize post-acquisition housing discrimination claims under
the FHA without addressing the post-acquisition aspect). This author found
only two federal district court cases prior to the Seventh Circuit's Halprin
opinion that expressly discussed the reach of the FHA beyond the transaction:
the original Halprin trial court case from 2002, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 901, and
Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 176-78 (D. PR 1995). In Schroeder,
the district court rejected the defendant's claim that FHA protection did not
extend beyond the purchase, noting that the FHA "does not lend itself to such
a narrow interpretation," because the "otherwise make unavailable or deny"
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should not be criticized for their failure to discuss the temporal
scope of the FHA, however, because Halprin was the first decision
of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to talk about this so-called
temporal scope of the FHA.221 While Judge Posner seems to think
that federal courts have been wrong about the FHA for nearly
forty years, the vast weight of authority choosing to ignore the
post-acquisition question supports the opposite contention: that
the FHA unequivocally extends to post-acquisition discrimination
as written. There is no Supreme Court holding on the postacquisition scope of the FHA,222 however, so the circuits remain
split.
IV. AMENDING THE FHA IS THE BEST WAY TO PROTECT
HOUSING OCCUPANTS FROM DISCRIMINATION
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is apparent the federal
circuits are divided over the post-acquisition reach of the FHA, a
split that needs to be resolved. It is also apparent that the FHA
can be, and has been for many years, accorded a post-acquisition
scope as written. 223 This Comment, siding with the courts and
commentators who recognize that the current FHA protects
occupancy, argues for Halprin to be reversed. There are two
224
primary ways to undo Halprin, judicially and legislatively.
First, the judicial route to change will be examined, but ultimately
rejected due to its unpredictability. Second, the legislative route
to change will be examined and ultimately accepted as the
preferred remedy to the problems created by Halprin.
Before proposing an FHA amendment, the wider context of

phrase "sweeps activities which go beyond initial sale." Schroeder, 879 F.
Supp. at 176-78. The occupant had a "continuing right to quiet enjoyment and
use of her condominium and common areas," and the owner's right to acquire
housing free from discrimination "encompassed the right to maintain that
dwelling." Id.
221. In Halprin, Judge Posner cited five earlier Circuit or Supreme Court
cases that recognized a post-acquisition scope of the FHA but criticized them
for not undertaking "a considered holding on the scope of the [FHA]." 388 F.3d
at 329.
222. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Cox case from the Fifth
Circuit, which if granted, would have afforded the Court an opportunity to
address the post-acquisition issue. Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2039, (2006).
223. See supra 219 (tallying Federal Circuits that recognize post-acquisition
claims); supra note 28 (reporting other cases upholding post-acquisition
claims).
224. Professor Schwemm suggested a third method of undoing Halprin:
HUD issuing a regulation that expressly interprets the FHA to protect
occupancy. Such a regulation would be "important to a judicial solution,
because the courts are supposed to give heavy deference to HUD's
interpretations of the FRA." Interview with Robert G. Schwemm, supra note
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whether the FHA has been, or can be, successful in combating
housing discrimination needs to be addressed. Nearly forty-one
years after the passage of the FHA, as previously reported,
housing discrimination and housing segregation remains
pervasive. 225 University of Kentucky College of Law AshlandSpears Professor Robert Schwemm, with over thirty-five years of
experience in fair housing law, questions whether our society
really wants to end housing discrimination. 226 While calling the
FHA's enforcement mechanisms "second to none,'227 Professor
Schwemm contrasts the "high degree of noncompliance with the
FHA" to the relative success that other federal civil rights laws
have had in fostering integration in America's workplaces and
public accommodations, 228 before concluding that housing
'
discrimination is a "uniquely intractable problem. "229
In response to the common occurrence of post-acquisition
housing discrimination, this Comment proposes a narrow
amendment to the FHA to protect occupancy rights. Expressly
protecting occupancy would make the FHA more logical, more fair,
and more consistent with the legislative intent behind it.
A. A Judicial Overrulingof Halprin Would be a Good
Start but not Sufficient to Solve the Problem
The Supreme Court could take a suitable case and resolve the
current circuit split by deciding whether the FHA prohibits postacquisition discrimination. 230 The benefit of a judicial overruling
of Halprin is obvious-a High Court decision would immediately
bind the Seventh and Fifth Circuits. 231 The downsides, however,

225. See TURNER, supra note 18, at iii (documenting state of housing
discrimination in 2000); ICELAND & WEINBERG, supra note 21, at 60
(calculating the extent of racial housing segregation in the United States using
data from the 2000 Census).
226. Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What
Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 456 (2007).
227. Id. at 462.
228. Id. at 459.
229. Id. at 460.
230. Supreme Court rules state that resolving a circuit split is one of the
primary reasons the Court grants a petition for a writ of certiorari:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of
this Court's supervisory powers.
SUP. CT. R. 10.

231. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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are numerous.
Even if the Supreme Court were to hold that the FHA
protects the occupancy rights, its decision would not adequately
settle the issue for two reasons. First, any judicial holding that
the FHA protects occupancy could be overruled by a future
Supreme Court. 232 Therefore, the permanence of a judicial
solution is suspect. Second, a positive Supreme Court holding
would not likely address every relevant provision of the FHA. As
discussed previously, many provisions of the FHA operate
independently, and each applies in some post-acquisition
situations. 233 Any single Supreme Court case, therefore, would be
very unlikely to grant certiorari on every relevant provision of the
FHA. In other words, even a favorable holding would not settle
the issue for every pertinent part of the FHA. Some sections or
provisions would remain unsettled. Because of this uncertainty,
even a favorable Supreme Court ruling is not a sufficient solution.
The foregoing presumes a favorable Supreme Court ruling,
something not at all assured. A strategy that depended on getting
the Court to reverse Halprin would be shattered by a Court
decision that endorsed the Halprin viewpoint. Suddenly, the
reach of the FHA would not just be stunted in the Seventh and
Fifth Circuits, but all across the country. While a negative Court
ruling would suffer the same frailties as a positive one, 234 in its
aftermath an unknown number of aggrieved persons would suffer
from post-acquisition discrimination, yet have no remedy under
the FHA. A negative Supreme Court ruling could have a positive
outcome for proponents of an FHA amendment because such a
ruling may spur Congress into action. 235

232. Although the doctrine of stare decisis calls for adhering to precedent
and counsels against reversing past decisions, the Court can reverse itself
when it chooses-"when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly
reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent."' Payne v.
Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
233. See supra Part III(E) (analyzing the provisions of the FHA applicable to
post-acquisition discrimination).
234. A negative Court holding, rejecting the post-acquisition scope of the
FHA, would be just as open to future reversal as a positive holding and would
be just as likely to only address some but not all of the relevant provisions of

the FHA.
235. Professor Schwemm suggested this scenario, comparing it to the
situation in 2007 when "Congress [was] considering a corrective response to
the [Supreme Court's] negative Title VII ruling in the Ledbetter (statute of
limitations) case." Interview with Robert G. Schwemm, supra note 93.
Professor Schwemm was referring to the controversial 2007 Supreme Court
case that rejected, by a vote of 5-4, an employment discrimination claim as
untimely, although the victim did not become aware of the discrimination for
many years. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 618
(2007). Professor Schwemm made these prescient comments during a phone
interview on October 8th, 2007. Interview with Robert G. Schwemm, supra
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B. A Legislative Overruling of Halprin,by
Amending the FHA, is the Best Solution
While the unpredictability of any judicial solution to the
Halprin problem has been examined, it merits noting that similar
uncertainty affects any legislative solution. Once Congress opened
the FHA, it would be subject to amendments and legislative
priorities far afield of the narrow issue of occupancy that
motivated the amendment process in the first place. 236
Alternatively, if Congress failed to pass the proposed amendment,
it could be taken by courts as an implied endorsement of the
237
Halprin position.
Although respectful of the risks, this Comment nevertheless
recommends amending the FHA to protect occupancy. A number
of post-acquisition claims are for sexual harassment, and this fact
could be promoted when lobbying Congress to amend the FHA.238
1.

Use § 3604(f) language from the 1988 FHA amendment

Perhaps the easiest way to amend the FHA, while
maintaining internal consistency and similar use of language,
would be to incorporate three phrases from the 1988 amendments
into the original provisions of the FHA.239
a.

Link "services and facilities" to the "dwelling"

First, the language in § 3604(f)(2) could be grafted onto
240
§ 3604(b). The exact words "in connection with such dwelling"
would be substituted for "in connection therewith," 241 thereby
note 93. Although Congress did not change employment discrimination law in
2007, it just recently legislatively overruled the Ledbetter decision. Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. By Professor Schwem's
logic, a similarly harmful fair housing ruling from the Supreme Court could
likewise spur a congressional amendment of the FHA. Interview with Robert
G. Schwemm, supra note 93.
236. Professor Caruso warned that amending the FHA is dangerous because
any attempt to improve or strengthen the Act would also open the door to
other harmful amendments that could narrow or weaken it. Interview with F.
Willis Caruso, supra note 95.
237. Professor Schwemm noted and then dismissed the risk, by pointing to
the Supreme Court's position that "unsuccessful Congressional attempts to
amend are not worth much interpretative weight." Interview with Robert G.
Schwemm, supra note 93.
238. Professor Schwemm noted that by focusing on the landlord sexual
harassment issue, Congress might be persuaded to take up the task of
amending the FHA and to keep any such endeavor limited to the task at hand.
Id.
239. The idea of looking to § 3604(f) for guidance on how to amend the other
provisions of the FHA was originally proposed by Professor Schwemm during
his interview. Id.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(2) (2006),
241. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006).
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the

broad

It shall be unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling,
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.

243

This change
alone would not prohibit post-acquisition
discrimination, but it would set the stage by indicating that the
FHA is concerned with what happens to the occupant of a dwelling
244
after the sale or rental transaction.
b.

Link "services and facilities" to "use and enjoyment"
Second,

a

paraphrased

version

of

the language from
§ 3604(b).
While
§ 3604(f)(3)(B) is about making "reasonable accommodations" for
the disabled, 245 the phrase "to afford such person equal

§ 3604(f)(3)(B) could be inserted into

opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling"246 could be incorporated

into§ 3604(b).247
As a result of this proposed amendment,
§ 3604(b) would read:
It shall be unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, or
in the provision of services or facilities that impaired the use and
enjoyment of such dwelling, because of race, color, religion, sex,
248
familial status, or national origin.

Inserting this or similar "use and enjoyment" language would
clearly protect occupancy rights, in relation to the provision of
services or facilities in connection with the dwelling.249

242. See supra Part III(E)(b) (examining the debate over the meaning of the
"in connection therewith" phrase in § 3604(b) and noting the existence of both
broad and narrow interpretations).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006) (emphasis added to indicate amended
language).
244. See SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at 14-3 (noting that HUD regulations,
courts, and commentators had assumed that § 3604(b) protected occupancy
rights; amending § 3604(b) to codify the broad interpretation that would
validate those previous assumptions).

245. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2006).
246. Id.

247. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006) (emphasis added to indicate modified
language).
249. The "use and enjoyment" phrase in the current § 3604(f)(3)(B) protects
occupancy rights. Short, supra note 24, at 217.
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c.

Link "use and enjoyment" to "intimidation and coercion"
Third, the same "use and enjoyment" phrase from
§ 3604(f)(3)(B)250 could be added to § 3617251 to explicitly prohibit
interference that occurs after the person has acquired the
dwelling. Amended this way, § 3617 would read:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any person in their use and enjoyment of a dwelling, in the exercise
or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or
on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by
252
section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
Incorporating the use and enjoyment language from § 3604(f)
would not only maintain internal consistency, but it would track
the HUD regulation interpreting § 3617, which presumes a postacquisition reach of § 3617.253
2.

Use § 1982 "to hold" language

Alternatively, the "to hold" phrase from the 1866 Civil Rights
Act 254 could be inserted into both § 3604(b) and § 3617 to protect
the right to hold onto already acquired housing, free from
discrimination. 255 If § 3604(b) was modified in this way, the
relevant part would read: "or in the provision of services or
facilities that impaired the right to hold such dwelling."256 If
§ 3617 was modified in this way, the relevant part would read: "[i]t
shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any person in their right to hold a dwelling."257 While the "to hold"
language is from the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the "use and
enjoyment" language is taken from the 1988 amendments to the
FHA. Use and enjoyment is the preferred language to use when
amending the FHA because it maintains internal consistency
within the FHA, and because it appears to be the more modern
250. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2006).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006) (emphasis added to indicate amended
language).
253. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2007) (promulgating a HUD regulation
that has prohibited "[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in
their enjoyment of a dwelling" since 1989).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
255. Using the "to hold" phrase in the FHA would presumably have the same
effect as such language has in § 1982, where it has been construed to protect
occupancy rights. See Schwemm, supra note 17, at 14-15 (reporting that
numerous cases have held that the "to hold" language prohibits discrimination
directed at occupants of housing).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006) (emphasis added to indicate amended
language):
257. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006) (emphasis added to indicated amended
language).
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phrasing.
3. Focus on the parties
Another approach would be to amend the FHA to add
language that puts the focus on the parties by defining who could
be a proper defendant. 258 For example, post-acquisition claims
would be appropriate against a housing provider or professional
(such as a landlord), 25 9 a homeowners' association, 260 or a
municipality, 261 which engaged in a discriminatory housing
practice. The benefit of this transactional approach would be its
thoughtful focus on those parties that have the ability to interfere
with one's occupancy rights 262 and to hold those parties liable,
even post-acquisition.
The detriment to this approach, however, outweighs its
benefits. The current FHA language does not expressly link
housing rights to the identity of the defendant. In fact, the FHA
defines a proper defendant very expansively as "the person or
other entity accused in a complaint of an unfair housing
practice." 263 An FHA amendment that aimed to protect occupancy
by defining the proper defendants in a post-acquisition complaint
would require extensive legislative drafting. Such an amendment
would also mean post-acquisition rights would be defined quite
differently than pre-acquisition housing rights. 264 Therefore, the
targeted amendments previously discussed in Part IV(B)(1) that
call for inserting language protecting "use and enjoyment" is the
preferred solution to the Halprin problem.

258. Professor Oliveri proposed this approach of looking at the parties when
asking whether the FHA as written applies post-acquisition. Oliveri, supra
note 118, at 39-40. Because this judicial approach to overruling Halprin has
already been rejected, this Comment uses Professor Oliveri's proposed way of
interpreting the current statute as an alternative basis for amending the FHA.
259. Id. at 40.
260. Id. at 53.
261. Id. at 49-50.
262. Id. at 39.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(n)(1) (2006); Professor Schwemm observed that the
FHA "makes little effort to define the scope of proper defendants." SCHWEMM,
supra note 17, at 12B:1. As a result, "anyone who commits one of the acts
proscribed by the statute's substantive provisions is liable to suit, unless he is
covered by one of the exemptions." Id.
264. Professor Schwemm thought that this factor-the extensive change
required to put the focus on proper parties-worked against this approach, as
maintaining internal consistency within a federal civil rights statute was an
important consideration. Interview with Robert G. Schwemm, supra note 93.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The FHA has had only limited success in eradicating housing
discrimination, much less in actually ending housing segregation.
A narrow amendment to the FHA could nevertheless expressly
protect the right to occupy a dwelling free from discrimination.
Many courts and commentators thought the FHA did sanction
such conduct as it is currently written. The ongoing circuit split,
with two circuits holding the opposite, indicates that the debate is
far from settled.
For proponents of fair housing, waiting for the Supreme Court
to resolve the conflict with a favorable holding is risky and
uncertain. The more efficient and comprehensive solution is to
amend the FHA as it approaches its forty-first anniversary,
removing any question whether the FHA protects occupancy. The
"use and enjoyment" language from the 1988 FHA amendment
could extend occupancy protection to § 3604(b). The same use and
enjoyment language from § 3604(f) could be used in § 3617 to
further protect occupancy from interference, intimidation, or
coercion.
Such a focused amendment to the FHA may be
achievable, and it would remedy an identified but continuing
housing discrimination problem.
Perhaps the Blochs' appeal will prevail and they will get to
proceed to trial. This would reopen the doors of federal court to
the Blochs, but not other victims of post-acquisition housing
discrimination. Even if the Bloch appeal led to Halprin'sreversal,
such a reversal would not change the law in the Fifth Circuit, nor
would it protect such claims from adverse judicial interpretation in
the future.
Only a targeted FHA amendment protecting
occupancy will solve the problem on a national scale.

